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Tredyffrin Easttown Historical Society
Source: October 1937 Volume 1 Number 1, Pages 2–12
One Hundred Sixtieth Anniversary of the Paoli Massacre
Itinerary of the Tredyffrin-Easttown History Club
September 26, 1937
Over the site of the British army encampment in Tredyffrin, Sept. 18-21, 1777, and over the route taken by Maj. Gen. Grey on the night of Sept. 20th to surprise Gen. Wayne's Division of the Pennsylvania Line at Paoli. One hundred and sixty years ago:
"In the radiant light of the autumn morn, Through fruitful orchards and fields of corn, From the river side to the highway brown, The English army came marching down. Through Chester vale to the city of Penn, Marched thousands of bronzed, red-coated men: Like a horde of locusts they onward stray, Bearing the spoils of the year away."
Catherine Rose Thropp Porter
1. The caravan to assemble on the Old Lancaster Road near the High School; at 2 P.M. proceed on the Howellville Road to State Road, turn right and follow State Road to just beyond grade crossing of the Trenton-Cutoff R.R., park and hike over field on right to fallen giant chestnut tree in which American scouts are said to have been posted to watch the approach of the British army and to have fired upon the van before escaping by way of the woods. This sentinel tree stood on the side of a private lane near the center of the camp of the 2nd Brigade commanded by Brig. Gen. Mathews, and from this camp the 40th and 55th regiments were detached at 11 P.M. under the command of Lt. Col. Musgrave, marched across the fields to the Bear Road, and took post across the Old Lancaster Road near the Paoli Tavern, on the night of the massacre, to act as a reserve. They were not engaged.
2. Return to cars and proceed eastward on State road; immediately on right the camp of the 16th and 17th light Dragoons, later commanded by the notorious Major Tarleton.
3. To the left, on top of hill in the valley, camp of the Guards, horse and foot, the elite corps of the army, Capt. DeWest, ranking as a Colonel in the service, commanded.
4. First house to the left, headquarters of Sir William Howe, Commander-in- chief of all the British armies in America. (Then home of Samuel Jones, now of Paul Freel.)
5. Cross Contention Lane, first house to the left, well in, quarters of Baron Knyphousen, Lt. Gen. of the Hessian troops. (Then home of James John, now of Wm. McCullum.) Gen. Knyphousen lost an eye and gained no laurels in the service.
6. Open fields to the right, camp of the 1st Brigade. The Division composed of the 1st and 2nd Brigades commanded by Maj. Gen. Grant who probably had his quarters in the original colonial house in the ravine between the two Brigades.
7. Continue on State Road to the Baptist Road, turn left and continue to the Swedesford road on which follow turn to the left at the gas station. On right, the camp of the Hessian and Anspach Yagers, horse and foot, commanded by Col. Van Wurmb; the only troops quartered north of the Swedesford Road.
8. On the left, a Brigade of Hessian Grenadiers, commanded by Brig. Gen. Lee and Count Darnop, whose quarters wore probably in the house of Jacob Frick, now removed. Dunop (sic) was mortally wounded later in the assault on Fort Mercer; his last words were, "I die the victim of my ambition and the avarice of my sovereign." Then the other Hessian brigade on the left; the Division commanded by Maj. Gen. Stirn.
9. Proceed up the valley past Wilson's corner; on the left immediately west of the Guards, camp of the 4th Brigade on same hill.
10. Close to the road, camp and park of the Artillery, commanded by Brig. Gen. Patterson.
11. Turn left on Cassatt Road at bridge over Chester Valley R.R. opposite entrance to Chesterbrook Farm; on right on continuation of the before mentioned high ground in the valley, camp of the 3rd Brigade, commanded by acting Brig. Gen. Agnew, who was slain in the battle of Germantown.
12. First house to the left, quarters of Lord Cornwallis, Maj. Gen. and most able British commander of the Revolutionary War. (Then the home of Abel Reese, now of Edward Blair.)
13. Turn right at top of hill and down the Howellville Road, cross over Trenton Cut-off bridge, and first house to the right, quarters of Gen. Agnew. (Then the home of Christian Workheiser, now owned by the Conowingo Power Co.
13. a. Near on rising ground, camp of the 64th Regiment.
14. Cross Bear Road in Howellville, on left, across branch of the Valley Creek, Quarryhill; camp of the 1st and 2nd Light Infantry, commanded by Sir George Osborn and Major Maitland.
14. a. On right, at point of triangle, just back of crooked sycamore, stood Howell's Tavern, (Then owned by Mary Howell), believed to have been the quarters of Maj. Gen. Grey, who commanded the Division composed of the 3rd and 4th Brigades.
14. b. Brig. Gen. Sir Wm. Erskine commanded the British Grenadiers drawn occasionally from the first companies of all the Regiments.
14. c. The Queen's Rangers, later commanded by Maj. Simcoe, Furguson's Riflemen, Commissory Gen. Wier's Department, Montressor's Engineer Corps, and other semi-detached troops, were doubtless in this vicinity, for the encampment was very compact and strongly situated between the present villages of New Centerville and Howellville. Maj. Furguson was killed in the battle of King's Mountain.
15. Turn left on Swedesford Road. Here and eastward near Davis' schoolhouse, the column was formed by Gen. Grey at 9 o'clock on the night of the 20th of September for the midnight attack upon Wayne. There were a small advance guard of Light Dragoons and Light Infantry, whose business was to dispatch all pickets without the use of firearms. They were followed by the main body composed of the 2nd Battalion of Light Infantry, the 44th and 42nd Regiments from the 3rd Brigade. The last was the famous Scotch Highland "Black Watch".
16. About 10 P.M. the column marched silently up the Swedesford Road, taking all the inhabitants en route to prevent an alarm reaching the Americans. A vidette advanced on the Swedesford Road challenged twice and galloped off at full speed.
17. Near the crossing of the Longford Road (Now Valley Store) a sentinel challenged, fired and escaped; the same occurred near the Warren Tavern. Tradition states that the British advances made use of the American countersign "Here we are and there they go", but the sentinels discovered they were enemies. Turn left on Longford road to where the column proceeded to Warren Tavern where the civilian prisoners were confined until after the fight. Here, a blacksmith, who lived near his forge, was forced to reveal the position of the picket, most of whom were "instantly massacred" as a British officer has recorded, and guided, it is believed by a Tory of the neighborhood; the column moved up the Lancaster Road to again strike the Longford Road on the right, on which they proceeded to the high ground near the present Baptist Church, when Gen. Grey rode to the front and cried, "Dash on Light Infantry".
The Paoli Massacre
Described from the West side of Malvern School Grounds
Standing here, on the Malvern School Grounds, we are in the best position to study the Paoli Massacre. As we stand, facing the afternoon sun, to our right is a cross roads. The road directly in front of us is Warren Avenue. It extends north and south. The road to our right which intersects the Warren Road at right angles is First Avenue of Malvern. It extends east and west.
But before we start the story of what happened in the foreground, on Sept. 20, 1777, let us review briefly the events leading up to it. For the summer of 1777, the British planned a grand campaign with a view to a complete conquest of the colonies. The main idea of this plan was to gain complete control of the Hudson River Valley. Then having the colonies cut in two, to subjugate first one then the other part. To this end the British Army under the command of General Burgoyne starting from Montreal as a base was to march down the Hudson Valley. Another British Army was to march from Lake Ontario along the Mohawk Valley and join Burgoyne in the vicinity of Albany. And a Third British Army under the command of Lord Howe was to advance from New York up the Hudson Valley and join Burgoyne and St. Ledger at Albany.
For some reason, the exact nature of which historians of today still dispute. General Howe instead of proceeding up the Hudson, took ship and sailed down the coast of New Jersey, and on to Chesapeake Bay. He entered Chesapeake Bay and sailed north to the Elk River. On the shores of the Elk River, about ten miles south of Elkton, Maryland, on August 25, 1777, Howe landed an army of twenty thousand British and Hessian troops. (The direction of the landing place from where we are standing is a little south of southwest, about across the farm house two hundred yards to run left fore ground. The distance from here is about forty miles as the crow flies.) Plainly the objective was the city of Philadelphia, the capital of the new nation.
A more direct attack could have been made on Philadelphia by the British from New York, across New Jersey. But the obstacles in this path were many. The year before, in 1776, that had been attempted, and frustrated by the brilliant strategy and tactics of General Washington in his victories of Trenton and Princeton, which had resulted in a hasty retreat of the English Army to New York.
The strategical problem confronting Washington was one worthy of all his powers. The whole Continental Army argumented by Militia was divided into three main parts. One of these confronted Burgoyne. Another lay across the path of St. Ledger. And the main part of the army under the Command of General Washington, in person, moved to confront General Howe. Washington had been in Northern New Jersey, keeping the British penned up in New York City. When Howe took ship, Washington was so informed by his spies. As Howe moved down along the Atlantic coast and up the Chesapeake, his progress was reported to Washington by his intelligence service.
Washington moved down across New Jersey, marched through Philadelphia and made his headquarters at Wilmington and from there extended his army in a line westward and northward, directly across the line of march of the British to Philadelphia.
Lafayette here rendered his first service to the American cause. He accompanied Washington on a reconnoitering expedition to Iron Hill, Delaware, just below Newark. From there the reconnoitering party could see the white tents of the British camp on the shores of the Elk.
A series of interesting maneuvers and skirmishes followed. The chief fight of which was at Cooches Bridge. (The story of this will probably be told, as a supplement to another field trip to those parts.) Eventually on the 10th of September, Washington took a very strong position at Chadds Ford on the Brandywine. On September 11th the battle of Brandywine ensued. That is still another story. (We as a club have toured the field. The itinerary and supplementary description will be issued by the club.)
Out-maneuvered and outnumbered almost two to one, after some severe fighting, the American Army withdrew from the Brandywine battlefield and marched to Chester during the night of the eleventh. The next day Washington marched north along the Delaware and crossed the Schuylkill (all the Philadelphia was east of the Schuylkill at that time.) and encamped at Germantown and prepared to defend Philadelphia by preventing the British from crossing the Schuylkill.
Washington was persuaded by some of his officers, however, on the fourteenth to cross the Schuylkill and try conclusions with the British again on the ground south of that river. (It is stated that the Americans were not satisfied that they had been beaten at Brandywine, but rather, that they had been merely outmaneuvered. And so, they were anxious for another chance. This is supposed to have been the very strong feeling in Wayne's Pennsylvania Brigades.)
On the 14th, Washington crossed the river. On the night of the fifteenth the American Army encamped at Malin Hall in Chester Valley, about one and one half miles northwest of the present town of Malvern. The camp extended westward along the Swedesford from its junction with the little Conestoga.
The British remained in the vicinity of the Brandyine battlefield, and along the road to Chester, for a few days. On the 15th they advanced toward Chester Valley in three columns. For them to go directly down to Philadelphia from Chadds Ford along Route 1 was impractical, for they had no way of crossing the river. All the boats were in the hands of the Americans. So they had to move higher up through Chester Valley and seek to cross the Schuylkill at some of the fords. The fords best suited were Swedesford (Norristown), Fatland Ford (Valley Forge), Long Ford, Gordens Ford (Phoenixville), Royersford and Parkers Ford. Cornwallis moved northward along Route 352 through Goshenville toward the valley. The Hessians moved through Turks Head (West Chester) and then in two columns one out Route 100 past the Indian King Tavern, and one on the road that leads past the Boot Tavern to the Great Chester Valley.
Cornwallis was encamped at Goshenville on the night of the 15th. On the morning of the 16th Washington moved his army south out of the Chester Valley and took position across Route 352, and west of it, on the high ground near the Three Tuns Tavern (just south of the present Villa Maria College). The British Army deployed on a ridge south of this about one mile. Both sides made preparation for the battle. However, particularly heavy rain storms, made the guns unserviceable. And still more important, the rains were rapidly making the roads in the valley into quagmires. This meant that Washington's line of retreat was not safe. So Washington, after a little skirmishing, moved back into the valley and took up a position on the high ground in the middle of the valley at Plain Brook (Philadelphia Memorial Park). He remained there until four o'clock in the afternoon.
The British, however, did not come down to attack him but remained on the South Valley Hills. At four o'clock on the afternoon of the sixteenth, Washington moved northward out of Chester Valley to Yellow (Chester) Springs, and on the following day to the Warwick Arsenal. There he refurnished his troops to some extent.
The affair at the Three Tuns has been entitled "The Battle of the Clouds".
Stormy weather continuing, the British remained in bivouac on the hill tops of the South Valley hills. On the 18th the British advanced down into Chester Valley and marched east and encamped in Tredyffrin. The camp extended along the Swedesford Road from Howellville to the New Centerville. (see Map #l) They remained there three days, awaiting the lowering of the river to normal at the fords. The continual rains of the 14th to the 18th have swollen the river, rendering it impossible. (The site of this camp we have visited today.)
As the American Army marching toward Warwick arrived at French Creek, Wayne on the seventeenth was detached and sent back into Chester Valley with the following three orders from Washington.
1. Take a position in observation of the British Army
2. When the British try to cross the Fords, I will oppose their passage with the main army, you attack their rear and cut off their baggage trains.
3. If you are attacked by superior numbers, withdraw, and join the main army.
Wayne was also informed that General Smallwood commanding 2,600 Maryland and Delaware troops, had been ordered to join him and cooperate under his command. This body of troops had not been with the main army thus far during the campaign. They had come up the Eastern Shore in the rear of the British army. They could be expected to join Wayne, on about the 20th.
From French Creek, Wayne marched to this ground, where we are standing, and on the hillside and in the woods to our left foreground bivouacked his two brigades. His artillery and baggage trains were at the farm to our left foreground. (Griffith - owner - Tory). The springs around the farm house, three of them, furnished his troops and animals with water. Four hundred yards to the north of this position was the King Road, over this road Wayne had marched to the camp. This road was to be his line of retreat if attacked by superior numbers, and he had been ordered to do in this event by Washington's orders quoted above. This road led along the ridge westward to the Indian King, and from there Wayne could readily cross on present route 100 to the French Creek country and so rejoin the main army. In fact, this is the line of retreat he did follow after the engagement.
Wayne had about two thousand men. A division of infantry, a four gun battery, and two brigade wagon trains were at this camp. (This estimate is not taken from history books, which usually place the figure lower, but it was computed from regimental returns, of various dates, from August to November, 1777, found in Pennsylvania Archives. Two returns at least covering the period were found for all except one regiment.)
The British Army in the camp at Tredyffrin greatly outnumbered the American Army contending with it. The numbers, twenty thousand British and eleven thousand Americans were the ones generally accepted. Washington had, just before this campaign, sent some of his best troops to aid Schuyler and Gates against Burgoyne. They included Morgans Riflemen, Poor Brigade, Learneds Brigade, and Glovers Brigade.
However, in spite of their superiority of numbers the British were obviously in a dangerous position in Tredyffrin. Twenty thousand men to feed was a big problem. They ravaged the country side thoroughly. No help could be expected from the fleet forty miles away. The country intervening was held by the Americans. Even if the British took Philadelphia they would be hard pressed for
for provisions. Strong forts and obstacles below Philadelphia held the English fleet at bay. As subsequent events showed, the forts blocked the river for nearly two months after the British actually did get into Philadelphia.
While the British were encamped at Tredyffrin waiting for the river to go down, they learned of Wayne's presence in their rear. Probably realizing the danger of an attack in the rear at the time of their attempting to cross the fords, they planned and executed an attack on Wayne. This was a daring thing for the British to do. Wayne's Brigades were well known as courageous fighters. They had acquitted themselves with great gallantry at Brandywine. However, the British of necessity must attack him. So on the night of the 20th of September they planned to send an expedition against Wayne and defeat him. Then as soon as the expedition returned, the whole army was to march to the fords and attempt a crossing before Wayne could recover. The river had gone down by this time.
The attacking party moved in two columns. One column, composed of the 40th and 55th Regiments, under the command of Col. Musgrave, marched up the Bear Road from Howellville, to the Old Lancaster Road (now Route 30) and took position across it at its junction with the Darby Road just east of the Paoli Tavern. They were not engaged.
The other column formed along the Swedesford Road near Howellville Tavern (Howellville Tavern was situated at the angle of the Bear and Swedesford Roads.) It was composed of an advance guard of light infantry and light dragoons--followed by the Second Brigade of light infantry, in turn followed by 44th and 42nd regiments. The 42nd was the Black Watch. This column was under the command of General (No Flint) Grey.
Now let us turn to the American Camp and see the dispositions that had been made there.
During the afternoon and evening Wayne received three pieces of information from reliable sources. They were:
1st. Smallwood will join you about 2 P.M. on the 20th.
2nd. The British plan to march from their camp in Tredyffrin toward the fords at two o'clock on the morning of the 21st.
3rd. The British plan to attack you and drive you well back, before they start toward the fords.
Wayne then took the following precautions:
First, he issued orders that the men of the division were to lie on their arms--not put them in stacks.
That the men were to keep their cartouche boxes under their coats--some of the boxes were not water proof.
Be prepared to form quickly, and ready to march, either toward the British camp in case they moved toward the fords, or to retreat in case of attack in accordance with his third order, were his instructions to the Division.
His second precaution was to increase the number of sentries and videttes-- vidette is a mounted sentry.
Thus prepared they went to rest and awaited events.
Now let us go back to General Grey's column. Use Map #1.
It started westward on the Swedesford Road at ten o'clock. As they approached Valley Store (junction of Swedesford Road and Longford Road) probably at Bull's Corner, one of Wayne's videttes, who was patrolling the Swedesford Road, saw them, challenged then, fired at then, and rode off to give the alarm. At Valley Store a vidette challenged, fired and escaped. The British column turned south into the Longford road, and approached Warren Tavern (at the intersection of the Longford and Conestoga Roads). At the Warren the column turned east on the Old Lancaster or Conestoga road which carried the Longford Road here for about 400 yards. About 400 yards east of the Warren, the Longford Road leaves the Lancaster Road and turns south, leading to the top of the ridge. (It is now Longford Avenue in Malvern). At this point a picket post (20 to 24 men) was posted. The picket fired a volley upon the British and retreated toward the camp firing as they retreated. General Grey then rushed to the front and shouted, "Dash on light infantry, dash on!" At this point they were still about one-half mile from Wayne's camp and approaching it from the right.
Now let us return to Wayne's camp and see what was being done there to prepare to meet the attack. Wayne received his first information of the attack from a returned vidette. He then formed the division. It formed in a line along the woods (in the foreground) probably about forty yards in front (north) of the woods, lacing north. Now use Map #3.
The artillery and baggage trains were on the right of the line so formed-- harnessed and hitched. By the time this preparation was completed, the firing at the picket posts, and by the pickets falling back toward camp, along the Longford Road, was clearly audible. Now, quoting General Wayne,
"When it was clear that the attack was coming from our right, I ordered the artillery to march off to the road (King) by which we had arrived at the camp."
(That road lies about 300 yards to our right as we stand here). The artillery moved off and retreated westward on the King road. Quoting Wayne again:
"I then ordered the light infantry and the first regiment to move out 400 yards from the right of line and form a line facing the enemy's advance. I went with them to see the line formed."
(See Map #3. This line extended about north and south along the line of the Road right before us or perhaps 50 yards further west.) Capt. Wilson of the first regiment, subsequently testified under oath, that Wayne had personally placed him and his company in this line, and that they stood there eight minutes before firing the first volley at the enemy, who had then approached to within 30 yards of them.
While this covering action was taking place, the main body-- the division-- was ordered by Wayne--"to wheel by sub platoons to the right". This was done. (The division line was then on the ridge in our foreground, about fifty yards up the slope, facing directly toward us as we stand here on the Malvern School Grounds). The order stated further that having wheeled, the division was to march off the field by the left, gain the King Road--and take position across the road on the high ground about 300 yards to the west. Wayne said that the division did not quickly obey this order. He observed that, from his position with the light infantry which was engaging the British Attack. He states that he sent back two repetitions of the order to Colonel Hampton, who commanded the division, before it moved off to the left. He further states that the entire division did not move as ordered but that some of the right of line (obviously confused) moved in the wrong direction. (That is to the right toward the Griffith farm house).
The American Light infantry line was forced to fall back before the superior number of the attackers. Fearing that the Division would not complete its maneuver before the attack struck it Wayne rode back to the Division and ordered the 4th Regiment to leave the line. He led that regiment forward toward the engagement and placed it with the light infantry. This proved sufficient to check
the advance of the British until the Division had marched off the field toward the King Road. Then the light infantry, 1st and 4th regiments began falling back, fighting a rear guard action, in the direction that the division had taken, successfully covering the retreat. The tactics here used by Wayne are similar to those used by Stonewall Jackson at the Battle of Cross Keys.
Now the English became confused. Their line of advance did not follow the retreating light infantry (toward the northwest) but made the camp, the fires of which were still glowing, its objective, and so swept diagonally across the field toward the southwest. (That is, toward the woods in our left Foreground.) See Map #1 and Map #3.
Thus the engagement really ended with the retreat of the American light infantry toward the northwest. Wayne formed the division again, across the King Road (about one half mile to our northwest) and awaited the British, who never came that way. Map #1.
But the engagement was not completely over, for part of the right of the American line had moved toward the right (the wrong direction). (This part was probably the second regiment and possibly the seventh also. We are not sure of this. It needs more study.) Their line of march, (as is obvious from here) took them directly across the front of the camp. They were silhouetted against the glowing camp fires, and their flank was exposed. In this position, totally unable to resist, they were struck in flank by the British advance, which as pointed out was to the southwest, routed and driven in disorder through the camp. Map #3.
It is probably described that as they ran in disorder through the camp hotly pursued by the British Light Infantry that many were killed at the doors of the tents or brush huts. It is also possible that sick men left in camp and sulkers, made a hasty retreat from the camp, and some of them were killed. Out of this circumstance probably arose the story traditional, afterward used as propaganda, that the British stabbed men in bed. This paragraph describes a probable action. There is nothing to authenticate it. However, the evidence shows that it or a very similar action took place.
The British light infantry was soon called back from the pursuit. The British column then formed and marched rapidly back to the camp in Tredyffrin. And at two A.M. in the twenty-first, the entire British Army got into motion toward Swedesford. Wayne's division remained in position as described above for several hours. See Map #l. But when it was clear that the British had withdrawn, Wayne, in compliance with his order, marched rapidly west in the King Road crossed the Chester Valley and joined the main army.
Smallwood, during the night was making a forced march to join Wayne, moving north on Boot Road, his advance guard reached Sugartown shortly after the engagement. Some of Wayne's men who had fled in that direction met Smallwood's advance troops at Sugartown and related what had taken place. Smallwood then moved on out the Boot Road past the Boot Tavern, and joined Wayne in the morning in the vicinity of Lionville. Smallwood then accompanied Wayne in the rapid march back to the main body.
Washington states in one of his letters that he had given up the idea of Wayne and Smallwood attacking the British rear at the Fords, and had sent orders on the 19th to Wayne to rejoin the main army by way of French Creek, as rapidly as he could. Wayne never received this order. It was probably intercepted by a British scouting party in Chester Valley.
The losses on either side are impossible to determine. The English never reveal their losses. Fifty-three Americans were buried by the farmers on the farm to the west of the battlefield. Griffith was a Tory and would not allow then to be buried on his farm. No doubt some of the wounded that escaped afterward died. The term Massacre appears to be a misnomer. Loss of fifty-three or even a hundred (I don't think we would be justified in placing it higher) out of two thousand could scarcely be called a Massacre. It is likely that the word Massacre was used as a propaganda to arouse the people against the English.
There was jealousy among the officers of the Division. A rumor was circulated. that Wayne was negligent that night. It has persisted to the present day and done Wayne's military reputation some damage. Wayne applied for a court martial to vindicate himself. His detractors were able to produce very little evidence against him. The findings of the court were to the general effect that Wayne had conducted himself with skill and courage, and had carried out his orders.
We will be glad if this little study does anything to add to the reputation of General Wayne - the most picturesque figure and witty and a quick spoken man, in the Revolutionary Army. There are traditional stories to the effect that the British took no prisoners that night. General Grey was a barbarous man as other events in his military career show. However, brutal as it may seem, the rules of war of that day provided to the effect that no prisoners were to be taken in night attacks. There are stories, also, (I know of one) where an individual American hotly pursued by a horseman was ordered "surrender or die". The American soldier had succeeded in getting his musket loaded by that time. His reply was to shoot his pursuer off his horse. But the Englishman offered to take him prisoner.
The British must be credited with great daring, courage, and skill for this successful night attack over unknown ground, on one of the best American divisions. They had to attack Wayne, to be sure, but it was very dangerous. Had Smallwood joined Wayne, the Americans would have outnumbered the English and a different result might have transpired.
The most brilliant victory of the Revolution was Wayne's capture of Stony Point two years later in a night attack, using the bayonet only. When the British surrendered, some of Wayne's men sent up the cry "Remember Paoli" and rush to bayonet the prisoners. Under the rules of war at that time Wayne could have put the entire captured garrison to the sword. But instead of that he and his officers restrained the men, and only one or two prisoners were stabbed. The capitals of Europe, on hearing of the victory at Stony Point rang with the praises of the military ability of the new nation. And they rang still louder with praise for the humanitarianism of the men of the New Nation, who took prisoners at night rather than bayonet them.
This story is based on:
1. Pennsylvania Archives and other documents
2. Traditional stories (father to son)
3. Field study of the terrain
Mr. Franklin L. Burns prepared Map #2 and the itinerary of the British Camp. Mr. S. Paul Teamer prepared Maps #1 and #3 and the story of the Massacre
The entire study as presented here is original (not compiled). Mr. Burns and Mr. Teamer have been studying the subject over a period of five or six years or even longer.
Page last updated: 2012-05-26 at 14:58 EDT